Portia shares blame in the diminished PNP brand
BOTH major political parties in Jamaica, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP), have undergone, settled on, and have engaged in some sort of branding and rebranding activities. They have redefined key elements of their political philosophy and ideology and have repositioned themselves in the political consciousness of the public. Both parties have changed leaders and have offered individuals who they believe are worthy and attractive enough to gain and retain positive voter perception.
The JLP started with a charismatic, intellectually incurious leader, Alexander Bustamante, whom voters loved and felt took their interest seriously enough that some vowed to “follow Bustamante ’till I die”. Put another way, Bustamante became the JLP’s brand and what emerged therefrom was a particular inseparability that has not served the JLP well in a post-Bustamante world.
The PNP chose Norman Manley, who, though visionary and intellectually advanced, voters found to be too serious and focused. The PNP’s philosophy, aims and objectives became the PNP’s brand, the party has emerged as the “intellectual powerhouse”.
In recent years, both parties have attempted to rebrand by switching leaders. One such rebranding occurred in 2006 when Portia Simpson Miller was selected to replace P J Patterson. At the time, many saw Portia as the modern and female version of Bustamante, mostly because of the perceived similarities in intellectual traits. The mistake that the PNP made in 2006 was not its decision to elect Portia Simpson Miller as party president. The mistake the PNP made was to allow Portia to conflate her popularity and brand value with that of the party.
The PNP should have allowed Portia to reposition the party in a way that made her feel that she is greater than the party itself. She started out on the campaign trail by saying, “A vote for Portia is a vote for the PNP, and a vote for the PNP is a vote for Portia…,” and ended up claiming the PNP’s victory as her own. By so doing, she automatically became to the PNP what Bustamante was to the JLP — the epicentre. Consequently, she made it virtually impossible for anyone to disagree with her without feeling they were also disagreeing with the party.
Her approach to secure brand loyalty was anchored in nothing else but unfettered narcissism. The PNP erred egregiously when it allowed Portia to cement the idea of inseparability without objecting. By attaching the party’s brand to Portia’s favourability ratings, the PNP completely ignored the fact that “what goes up must come down”. The PNP also disregarded the fact that Portia’s negatives, in addition to voter dissatisfaction, would inevitably become the PNP’s negatives, since the rebranding transformed the PNP into “Portia’s PNP”. To this very day, Portia continues to see an election contest as one, not between the PNP and the JLP, but as one between the JLP and Portia!
As with product branding, political branding aims to beget loyalty. Consequently, customer satisfaction and repeat purchases are key metrics which some marketers and brand managers use to determine brand value, brand reputation and brand loyalty, even in instances where they are cognisant of post-purchase dissonance. It is no different in politics.
It is true; a brand is intangible and psychological, the operative word is “psychological”. It makes no sense, on the one hand, to be promoting a brand as being superior to the competition’s, then on the other hand destroy and diminish the reputation of the very brand one seeks to elevate.
A successful politician is one who understands voter psychology and can “read” the mood and tempo of the society sufficient for him/her to “adjust in action”. P J Patterson was very adept at this; he knew how to “read” and he read the political tea leaves with expert precision. The PNP made the cardinal error of allowing Portia to practise P J Patterson’s politics without first acknowledging Portia’s limitations. The truth is, Portia is no P J. P J’s reluctance to communicate was completely dissimilar from Portia’s, and the ensuing voter blowback could not be any more evident. The difference between the two, outside of the obvious, is that P J knew how to regulate his filter.
As things now stand, brand PNP is paying the price.
Voter satisfaction and voter patterns are essential to political parties as they determine branding imperatives and consider rebranding strategies. The big difference between product and political branding, however, is that political branding is more about how a political organisation, or politician for that matter, wants to be and is perceived by the public on whom it must rely for support. The reason for the difference, as I see it, is that products are tangible, they carry certain material value; but politics is slightly different. Politics is a service and, as such, there is greater focus on qualitative values, although political decisions and activities could ultimately produce results that are tangible and highly quantifiable.
A political brand is the predominant feeling, impression and affiliation the public has towards political organisations. Threats to political brands can be as far-reaching as they are to product brands. It is because of the potential to destroy that marketers pursue pre-emptive and corrective tactics to protect and, in some instances, rebrand their product or service offerings. Political parties are always concerned with how the public perceives their brand. Shifts in ideology, philosophy, policies, aims, and objectives are a few of the things that can influence public perceptions of a political brand, be it positive or negative.
In the run-up to the December 2011 General Election, Portia promised to remove GCT on electricity bills, but there has been no such removal. When politicians make promises such as the removal of GCT on electricity, only to break them, it creates disappointment among voters who become distrustful of the brand and are more reluctant to support it. Furthermore, the distrust and disloyalty may not be instantaneous; it could take many years to reach full manifestation. But, until then, voter apathy and disinterest become chronic. One need not look too far, because there is sufficient evidence of voter distrust, disinterest, and apathy in Jamaica.
As with the JLP, I feel the PNP should consider significant rebranding beyond mere changes in top leadership. Both should consider ways to make their “product offerings” better and more appealing, by not committing to promises they cannot deliver or do not intend to deliver.
On a recent visit to Florida, I came across an old hardcover notebook neatly stashed away in one of my mom’s storage cabinet drawers. It contains scribbling my late father made at various times. The notebook contains copious notes on political leadership, grass roots organisation, enumeration, canvassing and conversion methods, mobilisation, communication, and political education. There are as many interesting side topics in his notes, as they are raunchy vignettes of certain happenings on various campaign trails. However, there are three bold inscriptions that ran central to many of the ideas and experiences he wrote about that I would like to share, if for nothing else but context.
On political leadership, communication, education, messaging, and electoral success, he inscribed thusly, “Always consider the “DENSITY” of the message and the receivers’ ability to understand and accept it, but never assume it is okay not to tell it. Carefully assess how to cover the “RADIUS” and adjust the circumference of your ambitions, if you have to and, depending on the objectives, think about the “SPEED” at which you have to, or you want to move…” These are but three little words that speak volumes about the value of substance, “stick-to-itiveness”, wise adjustments, and endurance. These are essential to political branding, rebranding and repositioning.
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